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RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATION:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
ROBERT L. HAMILTON* AND WILLIAM A. W. KREBS, JR.**

INTRODUCTION

Part of the price that society must pay for nuclear progress is the
subjection of some of its members to radiological hazards that are
created in the process of putting nuclear fission, radioactive isotopes
and radiation producing machines to work; Some of these hazards
are of an industrial health nature; some involve public health. Both
the federal government and many state governments have already
taken regulatory action aimed at holding radiation hazards to tolerable
levels.
The purpose of this article is to explore the question of how governmental responsibility for regulation of radiation hazards associated
with atomic energy activities may best be allocated between the
federal government and the states. While division of such responsibility is theoretically not essential-it being legally conceivable that
the federal government could shoulder the entire responsibility alone
or could leave it entirely to the states-various factors which will
be mentioned below appear to make some sort of division of responsibility a practical necessity. To explore this question of division of
responsibility, we shall first review the nature of radiation and the
hazards of radiation exposure, to protect against which governmental
regulation is deemed to be necessary. We shall next review the present
status of state and federal radiation protection regulatory patterns.
Finally, we shall set forth our conclusions as to the proper role of
federal and state governments at this time. It is our hope, in writing
this article, that our observations will be found worthy of consideration by legislators and administrators, both state and federal, who
are presently at work establishing public policy for the protection
of the citizens of their jurisdictions from excessive radiation exposure.
The process of establishing effective governmental regulation in
any field (using the term "regulation" generically to include both
statutes and administrative rules) involves the following four general
steps:
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(a) Identifying the problem: determining the need for and general objective of governmental regulation;
(b) Determining the standards which define acceptable and unacceptable activity;
(c) Formulating regulations which will achieve the desired
standards in an administratively practicable manner; and
(d) Devising procedures to enforce compliance.

While the foregoing steps are, of course, all interrelated, it is useful
at times to address one's attention to them one at a time.
In the field of radiation protection, the presence of widespread
federal regulation plus the increasing attention to the subject occurring at the state level' demonstrate that in many quarters the need for
governmental regulation of some sort is already felt. Step (a) above
has already been taken.
Step (b) is not primarily a legal matter; rather, it is largely within
the field of medical science and health physics. It involves a variety
of factors which are not part of the ordinary lawyer's or lawmaker's
stock in trade. Nevertheless, because regulating radiation exposure
involves blending nuclear medicine and legal procedure, it is essential
that persons acting in this field have at least a general understanding
of the relevant factors in each discipline that come into play. Accordingly, for the purpose of this article in a legal journal, considerable
attention will be given to step (b). Furthermore, in order for one
realistically to entertain the question of how governmental responsibility for radiation protection ought to be divided between the federal
government and the states, a general understanding of the basic
criteria underlying present day radiation protection programs is
essential.
Steps (c) and (d) will not here be considered in any detail, since our
primary purpose to suggest how best to allocate the responsibility for
radiation protection between the federal government and the states.

I. THE NATURE OF RADIATION AND THE
HAZARDS OF RADIATION EXPOSURE

A. Ionizing Radiationand Its Measurement
Ionizing radiation is electromagnetic radiation or particulate radiation capable of producing "ionization" in its passage through air or
other matter. Ionization is almost always caused by the removal of an
outer shell electron from a neutral atom or molecule, leaving it with a
positive charge. Ionization of human tissue is harmful. While radiation can damage tissue by various interaction processes, of which
ionization is only one, ionization is the easiest to measure and is
1. See part III. C. infra.

1959 ]

RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATION

usually assumed to be a constant fraction of total 'damage. Consequently, ionizing radiation is the principal subject of attention when
one investigates regulation for radiation protection.
The principal types of ionizing radiation are:
a. X-rays (Roentgen Rays), which are electromagnetic radiation usually produced in a machine by bombarding a suitable
target material with high speed electrons. They can range in
voltage from a few volts up to millions of volts. X-rays are of
varying penetrating power.
b. Gamma rays, which are the same as X-rays, except that they
originate from the nucleus of an atom and have a discrete rather
than continuous energy spectrum.
c. Alpha particles, which are helium nuclei traveling at high
speed.
d. Beta particles, which are electrons or positrons ejected from a
nucleus at high speed.
e. Neutrons. High speed neutrons cause ionization directly by
impact upon nuclei of other atoms; thermal (slow) neutrons
enter into nuclear reactions with other atoms, thereby indirectly causing the release of ionizing radiation.
f. Heavy-particle radiation, which refers to atomic nuclei of any
mass traveling at high speed.
Radiation varies as to its intensity. Intensity of radiation refers to
the rate of energy flow through a unit area perpendicular to the radiation beam per unit of time.2 It may be expressed in terms of ergs per
square centimeter per second. 3 Quantity of radiation, accordingly,
refers to the total energy that has passed through the unit area perpendicular to the radiation beam.4 It includes the factor of time and is
not merely a rate, as in the case of radiation intensity. Quantity of
radiation may be expressed in terms of ergs per square centimeter.
A dose of ionizing radiation refers to a quantity of radiation.5
For the purpose of setting permissible radiation exposure levels
there has been some difficulty in establishing a suitable unit of dose
measurement. The "roentgen" has been customarily used to express
a unit of quantity of X-radiation or gamma radiation. A roentgen,
which is defined in terms of ionizing effect in air, is "the quantity
2. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS HANDBOOK No. 59, PERMISSIBLE DOSE
FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES OF IoNIZN=G RADIATION 5 (1954), Recommendations

of the National Committee on Radiation Protection (This booklet will hereafter

be referred to as "NBS Handbook No. 59").
3. An "erg" is a unit of work. It is equal to one dyne of energy working
through a distance of one centimeter. A "dyne" in turn, is a unit of force
capable of making a mass of one gram accelerate at the rate of one centimeter
per second.
4. NBS HANDBOOK No. 59, at 5.

5. Ibid.
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of X- or gamma radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per .001293 grams of air produces, in air, ions carrying 1 electrostatic unit of quantity of electricity of either sign."6 While the
roentgen has in the past been used to establish values for permissible
doses, it is unsatisfactory for such purpose and has been largely discontinued. It is unsatisfactory first because it is in terms of the effect
of radiation in air. What is important in determining radiobiological
effects of radiation is absorbed tissue dose.
An absorbed dose of ionizing radiation is the amount of energy imparted to matter by ionizing particles per unit of mass of irradiated
material at the place of interest.7 Because radiation has a scattering
effect, an absorbed tissue dose will differ from an absorbed air dose
from the same quantity of the same type of radiation. For instance, an
exposure of a patient to a known radiation dose of twenty roentgens
per minute for ten minutes, which would be measured in air as 200
roentgens, might create an absorbed surface tissue dose from 220 to
300 roentgens. 8 Furthermore, X-rays can be of widely varying voltage
ranges, with varying degrees of penetrating power. The absorbed tissue dose of a one roentgen of low voltage ("soft") X-rays is not the
same as the absorbed tissue dose of a one roentgen of high voltage
("hard") X-rays. In addition, the roentgen was used only for X- and
gamma rays. A different unit of measurement, the rep (roentgenequivalent-physical) was developed for specification of a roughly
equivalent dose of radiation other than X-rays and gamma rays. The
rep is a unit of absorbed dose (therefore dissimilar to the roentgen,
which is not a unit of absorbed dose, even in the air) with a magnitude
of 93 ergs per gram.9
Upon publication of NBS Handbook No. 59 in 1954, the National
Committee on Radiation Protection adopted the rad as the unit of
absorbed dose for all types of radiation. 10 A rad is 100 ergs per gram."
However, even the rad fails as an effective common denominator unit
for specification of permissible radiation exposure. The biological
effect of 100 rads of one type of radiation is not necessarily the same
as the biological effect of 100 rads of another type of radiation. Moreover, even the same type and quantity of ionizing radiation affects different types of cells differently. While there is no such thing as exact
equivalence of biological damage produced by X-rays, neutrons, and
alpha and beta rays or particles, the rem is the name of the unit employed for such purpose. It is defined as "the quantity of any ionizing
6. Id. at 6.
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Id. at 6.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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radiation such that the energy imparted to a biological system (cell,
tissue, organ, or organism) per gram of living matter by the ionizing
particles present in the region of interest, has the same biological
effectiveness as an absorbed dose of 1 rad of X-radiation with average
specific ionization of 100 ion pairs per micron of water in the same region."'12 Using a conversion factor known as RBE (relative biological
effectiveness), which is determined empirically for the several types
of radiation, one can determine the number of rems that any given
number of rads of any type of radiation will produce. Most federal
and state radiation protection regulations couch maximum permissible
doses in terms of rems.
B. Sources of Radiation
Sources of radiation are manifold. First, there is "background radiation," which is the radiation from cosmic rays from outer space and
from radioactive materials in place in nature. Background radiation
is a normal part of the environment in which man has always lived.
It is therefore generally considered not to be harmful.
Next, there is radiation from concentrations of naturally occurring
radioactive materials-primarily radium, thorium, and uranium. While
not of significance in their disposition in nature, these materials can
pose a health hazard when handled in the process of being mined,
refined or concentrated.
Thirdly, radiation can be artificially created by machines: X-ray
machines, fluoroscopes, and various types of particle accelerators (Van
de Graaff accelerators, cyclotrons, betatrons, synchrotrons, cosmotrons, etc.). These machines are valuable for a number of different
applications. Their operation can also cause some risk to persons in
their vicinity.
In the fourth place, radiation can be created in the process of
nuclear fission. Nuclear fission creates basically three products: heat,
radiation, and radioactive isotopes or "fission fragments." In nuclear
weapons the fission process is not contained, but rather is designed to
achieve destructiveness of varying amounts according to the mission.
Nuclear reactors, on the other hand, are designed to provide continuing control over the fission process and have shielding to protect
persons in the vicinity from the hazard of direct radiation exposure;
they may also provide positive containment, if necessary, to protect
against any escape of radioactive fission fragments. Reactors can
be designed to "maximize" either the heat produced, the direct
radiation produced, or the radioactive isotopes produced.
Fifthly, radiation can be produced by nuclear fusion. While fission
occurs upon splitting of certain atoms which are very heavy in the
12. Id. at 31.
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atomic tables, fusion occurs when certain very light elements join
together to form new atoms. In both processes, large amounts of
energy can be released. In both processes there is considerable release of direct radiation. However, in the fusion process the problem
of radioactiv-e fission fragments is not present.

Finally, radiation is emitted by materials made radioactive artificially. Many materials which are not radioactive in a natural state can
be made so by bombardment in a particle accelerator or by being
exposed to neutron radiation from a nuclear fission process. Fission
fragments created during the course of nuclear fission may likewise
be considered artificially created radioactive isotopes.
C. Effects of Radiation Upon Man*
It is generally understood that "small" doses of radiation, such as
those which nearly everyone has received in a doctor's or dentist's
office, involve no hazard to one's well being, while "large" doses of
radiation, such as those from nuclear bombs, can cause serious injury
or death. Something more definite than this type of general understanding is needed, however, when one confronts the question what
to do about regulating exposure.
The following table provides, as a start, a general indication of the
effects upon man of various "acute" doses of radiation, i.e., doses received within a 24-hour period:
PROBABLE EARLY EFCTS OF AcUTE RADIATION
DOSES OVER WHOLE BODY TO MAN

Acute Doses (Rems)
0-25
25-50
50-100

100-200
200-400
400

600 or more

13

ProbableEffects
No obvious injury
Possible blood changes, but no
serious injury
Blood-cell changes, some injury, no
disability
Injury, possible disability
Injury and disability certain, death
possible
Fatal to 50 per cent
Possibly fatal to 100 per cent

The information in the above table is of statistical derivation. Actually, there is a variation in the effects of radiation upon different persons. The acute dose that will kill fifty per cent of persons exposed is
about 400 rem. Twice this dose will kill all persons; half such dose
13. U.S.

DEP'T HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, KINSMAN, RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH

HANDBOOK 183 (1957) (hereafter referred to as "USPHS Handbook").
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-will prove fatal to a few. It will thus be noted that there is approximately a factor of four in the variation of effects of radiation in the
lethal dose range upon different individuals. A similar spread exists
in the lower dose ranges where the effects are less severe. It
probably also exists in the still lower "permissible lose" range,
where the effects of radiation are generally not perceptible. This
phenomenon is not unique to radiation caused injury, but is comparable to the variability of effect of any given physiological stimulus on
biological organisms.' 4
A special phenomenon of radiation injury is the time lapse between
the manifestation of injury and the exposure to ionizing radiation
causing the injury. Where the radiation dose is relatively high, the
delay in appearance of injury is relatively short; where the dose is
low, the latent period may be very long, as much as twenty five years.15
Unfortunately, it is concerning the long delayed effects of small doses
of radiation about which scientific knowledge is still somewhat scanty
today. The following table is a summary showing some of the
symptoms, including the latent period, following relatively severe
acute doses of radiation:
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS RESULTING FROM WHOLE BODY

ExPOSURE TO RADIATION TO MAN 16
0-25 rem
50 rem

100 rem

200 rem

Mild Dose
No detectable clinical effects
Probably no delayed effects
Slight transient reductions in lymphocytes and neutrophils
No other clinically detectable effects
Moderate Dose
Nausea and fatigue with possible vomiting above 125
Reduction in lymphocytes and neutrophils with delayed recovery
Delayed effects may shorten life expectancy as much
as one per cent

Nausea and vomiting within 24 hours
Latent period about one week, perhaps longer
Following latent period, epilation, loss of appetite, and
general malaise
Sore throat, pallor, petechiae, diarrhea
Moderate emaciation
14. NBS HNDBooK No. 59, at 8-9.
15. Id. at 9.
16. USPHS HANDBOOK at 183.
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Possible death in 2 to 6 weeks in a small portion of
individuals
Recovery likely unless complicated by poor previous
health, superimposed injuries or infections
400 rem

Median Lethal Dose
Nausea and vomiting in 1 to 2 hours
Latent period, perhaps as long as one week
Beginning epilation, loss of appetite, and general
malaise accompanied by fever and severe inflammation of mouth and throat the third week
Pallor, petechiae, diarrhea, nosebleeds, rapid emaciation about the fourth week
Some deaths in 2 to 6 weeks. Possible eventual death
to 50% of the exposed individuals

Lethal Dose
Nausea and vomiting in 1 to 2 hours
Short latent period following initial nausea
Diarrhea, vomiting, inflammation of mouth and throat
toward end of first week
Fever, rapid emaciation and death as early as the
second week with a possible eventual death to 100%
of exposed individuals.
While successive radiation doses have a cumulative effect, it is not
a matter of simple addition to determine the total effective dose.
Living organisms have a recuperative power which comes into play
to provide natural recovery for radiation injury in a manner comparable to their recuperative power for other types of injury.17 Such power
provides a mitigating effect in cases of radiation exposure. The following table illustrates the difference between total accumulated
dose and effective accumulated dose for various dose rates:
600 rem

ESTIMATE OF EFFECTIVE DOSE FROM

VARIOUS DOSE RATES

Days
1
3
5
10
15

TO MAN

18

Effective
Accumulated
Accumulated
Dose (Rem)
Dose (Rem)
50 Rem per Day Exposure
50
50
150
135
250
204
500
330
750
395

17. NBS HANDBOOK No. 59, at 9-12.
18. USPHS HANDBOOK at 184.

1959 ]

RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATION
100 Rem per Day Exposure
100
300
500
1000

100
271
409
663

200 Rem per Day Exposure
200
600
1000
2000

200
542
819
1326

Injury to man is not the result of ionizing radiation penetrating and
injuring one particular critical spot in one's anatomy. It can cause
injury to any part of one's system. We have previously noted that
different types of radiation produce different degrees of injury
to human tissue. The same type of radiation may cause different
degrees of injury to different cell types. Other variations, such as
in the duration of exposure, can not only cause changes in both the
effect of radiation exposure, but also the relative effectiveness upon
different types of cells. The following tables illustrate these points:
ILLUSTRATION OF DIFFERENTIAL VARIATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO SPECIFIC IONIZATION 19

Lethal Dose in Rads

Cell Type A
Cell Type B
Dose Ratio B/A

X-Rays
1,000
2,000
2

Dose Ratio
X-Rays to
FastNeutrons FastNeutrons
200
5
500
4
2.5

ILLUSTRATION OF DIFFERENTIAL VARIATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO TnE FACTOR20

Lethal X-Ray Dose in Rads
Short
Long
Exposure
Exposure

Dose RatioLong to Short

Cell Type P
1,000
1,500
1.5
Cell Type Q
2,000
2,500
1.25
Dose Ratio, Q/P
2
1.67
In the words of the National Committee on Radiation Protection
(NCRP):
19. NBS HANDBOOK No. 59, at 15.

20. Ibid.
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In dealing with the biological effects of ionizing radiation in general,
whether we think in terms of radiosensitivity or biological effectiveness,
we are inexorably 'plagued' by 'differences in differences.' The typical
problem involves two distinct biological entities and two radiations of
significantly different specific ionizations. . . . [Illustrated by the first
table above.]
Differential variations may occur with only one type of radiation when
another parameter is different. [Illustrated by the second table above,
time being the parameter.] There are of course many other types of
differential variations; for instance, with respect to age, oxygen tension,
temperature, etc. 21

Given a known radiation exposure to a limited portion of the body

and complete knowledge about the particular organism irradiated,
it is theoretically possible to predict the injury to a particular organ,
within the limits of biological variability, by taking into account the
ionizing properties of the radiation, its penetrating power, the scatter-

ing effect upon its passage through tissue, the attenuation caused by
its traversing matter, and the radiosensitivity of the organ in question. The case presented by exposure of the entire body to ionizing
radiation is much more complicated. While all organs are irradiated,
some receive relatively larger doses than others, due to differences in
size or location. Furthermore, injury to any particular organ may be
caused not only directly by the radiation but also indirectly by the
failure of some other organ to function properly. In the words of the
NCRP:
The situation concerning exposure of the entire body to radiation may
be summarized as follows: The distribution of radiation within the body
determines the doses received by the different organs. The effects produced in each depend largely on the dose and the radiosensitivity of the
organ. The combination and interaction of all these effects in different
organs of the body will modify the over-all effects. All other conditions
being the same, differences in over-all effects, in degree and/or in kind,
can be expected:
(1) When the distribution of radiation within the body is different, because the relative doses received by the organs will be different;
(2) When the total dose is different, because all organs are affected more
by larger doses and some organs that are unharmed by small doses
will be injured by larger doses;
(3) When the time of administration of the total dose is different, because
of differential variations due to changes in the relative radiosensitivities of the organs (largely due to inherent differences in recovery
rates for different organs);
(4) When the instantaneous dosage rate or the dose fractionation with
respect to time is different, because of possible differential variations
due to changes in relative radiosensitivity;
(5) When the specific ionization is different (two different kinds of
radiation), because of differential variations due to difference in RBE;
21. Id. at 14-15.

19591

RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATION

(6) When the tissue depth-distribution of the specific ionization is different, because the RBE at different depths will be different;

(7) When, in general, any factor that introduces differential variations is
22
different.

Ordinarily, however, nobody will have complete knowledge about
the physiological characteristics of any particular organ, not to speak
of an entire human body. There has therefore been developed the
concept of the "standard" man, an idea no doubt capable of raising
the eyebrows of the legal fraternity, accustomed as it is to dealing with
a different hypothetical being, the "reasonable" man. The standard
man concept is simply a tabulation which ascribes specific quantitative
values to the various physiological characteristics of an average human
being for the purpose of making analytical computations of the effects
of radiation on a person. For instance, for every organ in an adult
human body it provides figures for its mass in grams, its per cent of
total body, and its effective radius. The standard man concept also
includes figures for the chemical composition of the average individual
and other data of relevance in calculating radiation injury. 23
While our attention thus far has been directed toward the effects
upon human beings of ionizing radiation from sources external to the
body, one must not overlook the hazard presented by sources of radiation internal to a body. A radioisotope which finds its way inside a
human body will cause more harm than a like source outside.2 The
reason for this is that a radiation source inside the body will continuously irradiate parts of the body until it is eliminated or decays
to a level of activity that is not significant. Furthermore, low energy
radiation (which, if from an external source, would be stopped by
skin and tissue before reaching any critical organs) presents the
possibility of injury by coming in direct contact with a critical organ
internally.
Radioisotopes can enter the body by inhalation, ingestion, or through
pores or breaks in the skin. How the radiation source enters the
body will have a bearing on the way it will be absorbed into the system, the length of time it will remain, and the particular organs it
may affect.25 All of these factors are material in ascertaining the
hazard presented. Other factors of importance are the chemical form
of the radioisotope and its physical state at the time of entry into
the body.26 And, of course, the quantity of radioactive material enter22. Id. at 16-17.
23. USPHS HANDBOOK at 193-96.
24. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
SIBLE AMOUNTS OF RADIOISOTOPES IN

HANDBOOK No. 52, MAXIMUM PERMIS-

THE HUMAN
AND WATER 3

BODY AND

(1953)
hereafter be referred to as "NBS Handbook No. 52").
25. NBS HANDBOOK No. 52, at 6.
26. Ibid.
MISSIBLE
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tained in the system is of prime importance. Elimination of sources
of radiation inside the body is accomplished through exhalation,
urination, defecation, perspiration, and possibly through physical
removal of the tissue containing the radioisotope in question, by
accident, surgery or natural processes.
Once a radioactive material has entered the system, the extent of
damage that can be caused by it depends upon many factors in addition to those mentioned above: the amount that is initially absorbed
(in, say, the gastrointestinal tract or the respiratory tract); the per cent
of the initially absorbed amount which goes into the bloodstream;
whether that which goes into the bloodstream becomes eliminated or
is deposited in one or more particular body organs; the radiosensitivity of the portions of the body where the radioactive material is
deposited; whether the material is deposited more or less evenly
throughout the body, or instead is concentrated in one particular
organ; the size of the affected organ relative to the quantity of radioactive material present; the importance of the affected organ to the
proper functioning of the body as a whole; the rate of physiological
elimination of the radioactive material once deposited in a critical
organ, i.e., its biological half-life; the length of time the material
remains radioactive, i.e., its radioactive half-life; and finally, the type
27
of radiation emitted by the radiation source.
"Differences within differences" occur in this situation too. The
hazard from the same quantity of radioactive material absorbed in
the same manner will vary with the individual involved: children will
be affected differently from grown persons; pregnant women will be
affected differently from women who are not pregnant; and there
is always the factor of four in the biological variability among apparently similar individuals32
There is some evidence that radiation exposure in sufficient doses
tends to shorten lifespan.2 9 This evidence is, apparently, based on
controlled experiments with mice and rats. Because of the biological
variability that must be taken into account in such experiments, the
effects of small doses cannot be evaluated experimentally, but are
derived by extrapolation of high dose data. Furthermore, since there
is such a wide difference in biological organism between human beings
and mice or rats, the only sound conclusion relative to man is that
radiation exposure in sufficient doses is likely to shorten lifespan.
Quantitative data in this regard is not yet available.
There is even more evidence that ionizing radiation can cause
changes in genes and chromosomes in germ cells.3 0 Again the evidence
27. Id. at 6-10.
28. Id. at 8-9.
29. NBS HANDBOOK No. 59, at 19-20.

30. Id. at 17-19.
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with respect to genetic mutations is based upon experiments with
animals. In this area, not only does biological variability cloud the
issue, but one must reckon with the fact that genetic mutations occur
"spontaneously," that is, for our purposes, from causes unrelated to
exposure to radiation other than background. Cause and effect cannot
be nicely identified and isolated. However, it is apparently established
that the frequency of occurrence of genetic mutations is directly related to the magnitude of the radiation dose, regardless of duration of
exposure, and that it is observable at relatively low radiation doses.3 1
In any event, the deleterious (or, in rare cases, beneficial) effects of
such radiation-induced genetic mutation will not become manifest in
the lifetime of the person irradiated, but only in subsequent generations.
II. PRESENT CONCEPTS OF PERMISSIBLE
EXPOSURE TO IONIZING RADIATION
A. Radiation Exposure as a'Necessary,Reasonable Risk
As with the development of steam power in the ninteenth century
and the internal combustion engine in the early part of this century,
the present-day development of atomic energy involves creation of
new and socially desirable activities while at the same time creating
new hazards to the health and safety of the populace. We are not
dealing with an activity so hazardous or so socially insignificant that
the prudent thing to do is to prohibit it altogether. Nor are we dealing
with a socially desirable activity with hazards so insignificant that no
special action need be taken to curb the harm that may be caused by
it. Our field is one in which the benefits to be achieved through the
use of atomic energy and ionizing radiation must be carefully balanced against the attendant hazards. We have, in the previous section,
elaborated in some detail upon the hazards associated with ionizing
radiation. It may therefore be appropriate to mention, quite briefly,
some of the many advantages gained through its use: alleviation of
untold suffering and death through diagnostic and therapeutic use
of X-rays; savings of millions of dollars annually in industry through
use of radioisotopes; substantial augmentation of the world's available
power supplies through use of nuclear power reactors; creation of new
capabilities for sustained land, sea, air and space transportation by
use of nuclear propulsion reactors; and discovery of more information.
about the fundamental nature of the universe in which we live.
The basic problem of radiation protection is, therefore, to ascertain
how much radiation exposure may be permitted for individials or
groups while pursuing the desired benefits, by the light of the best
31. Id. at 17.
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current understanding of both the ends sought and the hazards involved.32 A separate problem (and one which we shall not consider
in this article) is to determine what special measures, if any, are
required to provide appropriate compensation to those who are injured
by such exposure.
B. Basic Criteriafor Radiation Protection

In this country the National Committee on Radiation Protection
(NCRP) 3 has established the basic criteria for permissible exposure
to radiation. One starts from the proposition that there is, strictly
speaking, no radiation dose level so low that one can say categorically
it will not cause harm.3 The NCRP defines "permissible dose" as:
the dose of ionizing radiation that, in the light of present knowledge, is not
expected to cause appreciable body injury to a person at any time during
his lifetime.35
It goes on to define a "permissible weekly dose" as:
a dose of ionizing radiation accumulated in one week of such magnitude that, in the light of present knowledge, exposure at this weekly rate
for an infinite period of time, is not expected to cause appreciable bodily
36
injury to a person at any time during his lifetime.
By "appreciable bodily injury" is meant:
any bodily injury or effect that the average person would regard as being
objectionable and/or competent medical authorities would regard as being
deleterious to the health and well-being of the individual.37
In NBS Handbook No. 59,38 the NCRP provides a series of rules
setting specific values for permissible weekly doses of various types
of ionizing radiation, with special reference to:
a. Specific organs or parts of the body exposed
b. Types of radiation involved
c. Age of the person exposed, in relevant cases
d. Non-occupational vs. occupational exposure
e. Accidental or emergency exposure to larger than weekly permissible doses
We shall not here consider these rules in detail, except to note the
general basic permissible weekly tissue dose for exposure of adults
32. See Taylor, Radiation Exposure as a Reasonable Calculated Risk, 1

PHYsics 62 (1958), for an exposition of this same point of view-and
in a lawyerlike manner-by Dr. Lauriston S. Taylor, Chairman of the National
Committee on Radiation Protection.
33. See part III infra, for a discussion of the organization and activities of
the National Committee on Radiation Protection.
34. NBS HANDBOOK No. 49, at 20-21, 74.
35. Id. at 27.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 61-73.
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under forty-five years of age to ionizing radiation from. external
sources for an indefinite period of years, which is as follows:3 9
Skin
Bloodforming Organs
Gonads
Lens of the Eye

600
300
300
300

mrem (millirem)
mrem
mrem
mrem

(Note: a millirem is 1/1000 of a rem)
Other organs and tissues of the body are between
600 and 300 millirems depending upon depth of
the region in interest from the surface of the
body, according to a special table.
In NBS Handbook No. 52 the NCRP provides a table of maximum
concentrations of radioisotopes permissible in the human body. 40 These
values are presumably consistent with those in Handbook No. 59 and
are based upon consideration of all of the factors noted above in the
discussion of internal radiation exposure.
Thus far we have been talking primarily about occupational exposure. Detailed information about radiation exposure and ability to
control it depends upon personnel control in the areas where such
exposure is capable of taking place. The NCRP also recognizes the
possibility of non-occupational exposure. Non-occupational exposure
to direct radiation outside a controlled area will not ordinarily exceed
that inside the area. The NCRP therefore directs its attention, in the
case of non-occupational exposure, primarily toward protection of
minors (persons under 18), whose radiosensitivity is greater than that
of adults. It recommends that activities be conducted in such a manner
that no minor receives a dose in excess of one-tenth of the values
specified in NBS Handbook No. 59.41
Maximum permissible concentrations of radioisotopes that may be
released to the environment in air or water beyond the control of
the user are specified in NBS Handbook No. 52.42
C. Changing Standardsof PermissibleExposure to Radiation
It should be borne in mind that over the years there have been
several changes in the thinking as to what constitutes acceptable radiation exposure. Each change to date has been in the direction of
39. Id. at 42-43, 61-62.
40.
41.
42.
sible
sible

NBS HANDBOOK No. 52, at 14-16.
NBS HANDBOOK No. 59, at 57.
NBS HANDBOOK No. 52, at 11. A more recent listing of maximum permisamounts of radioisotopes in the human body and the maximum permisconcentrations in air and water for continuous exposure appears in

USPHS HANDBOOK at 187-91.
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lower limits. Permissible occupational exposure doses have varied
43
approximately as follows:
Rems/Year
Prior to 1934
Approx.
100
1934-1935 (200 mrem/day)
60
1935-1948 (100 mrem/day)
30
1948-1957 (300 mrem/wk)
15
19575
This trend reflects a number of factors and should not be interpreted
to mean that the scientists previously underestimated the hazards of
radiation exposure by a factor of twelve or more. In the first place,
prior to World War II, occupational exposure was, by and large, confined to radiologists and other professionals. This group was small in
total number, and its members were generally aware of the desirability of keeping radiation exposure to a minimum. The average of
300 mrem per week or fifteen rems per year (fifty work-weeks per
year) was established after World War II at a time when widespread
uses of atomic energy were just beginning and the numbers of persons
subject to exposure vastly increased. In addition, more information
had then become available about the biological effects of radiation.
Lastly, instrumentation capable of measuring and recording such
lower dosages was then available. In short, lower levels were set not
because it was unduly dangerous to be exposed at the higher levels
but'because "the best radiation dose is no dose" and because it was
then feasible to prescribe lower limits.44
In 1954, when NBS Handbook No. 59 was first published, the NCRP
did not believe that genetic damage was a limiting factor in setting
permissible levels for occupational exposure. Its reason was that the
primary concern of the geneticists is not the dose per individual, but
rather the total dose to the population:
The amount of radiation received by the gonads of one individual, up to
the time of conception of the last child in his family, can be very large
without noticeably damaging the population as a whole-provided that
only a very small fraction of the whole population is exposed to this
extent. 45
Concern for injury to the individual, rather than genetic injury to
the entire population was the basis of the rules in Handbook No. 59.
Because of increased concern for genetic injury arising from more
widespread use of radioactive materials, rapid advances in the development of nuclear power, and rising concern over fall-out, the NCRP
43. Taylor, Radiation Exposure as a Reasonable Calculated Risk, 1
PHYsics 62 (1958).

44. See Taylor, op. cit supra at 64-65.

45. NBS HANDBOOK No. 49, at 18.
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in January of 1957 issued a preliminary statement revising its previous
maximum permissible exposures to ionizing radiation to, in general,
one-third of previously established levels. More precisely, in the
words of the Chairman of the NCRP, it provided:
Accumulated Dose. The maximum permissible accumulated dose, in
rems, at any age, is equal to 5 times the number of years beyond age 18,
provided no annual increment exceeds 15 reins. Thus the accumulated
MPD = 5(N-18) rems where N is the age and greater than 18. This applies
to all critical organs except the skin, for which the value is double.46
Undoubtedly the NCRP took into account, when making its new recommendation, the facts that most radiation users maintained a sufficient margin of safety under the old permissible levels to allow them
to meet the new standard, and that advances in the field of nuclear
instrumentation made compliance with the new level feasible.
This progressive lowering of maximum permissible dose levels is
really a tribute to the nuclear industry: it represents major progress
toward the ultimate in radiation protection, namely, no occupational
exposure in excess of background (or no occupational exposure at
all).
Both NBS Handbooks numbers 52 and 59 are made out of date by
this new change in permissible level, as are all other NBS Handbooks
relying upon the old permissible levels, and, as we shall see in the
following section, all state and federal regulations based upon the old
levels. The National Committee on Radiation Protection is currently
in the process of rewriting its Handbooks in a manner consistent with
its new philosophy.
D. RadiationDetection and Measurement Instrumentation
Atomic age wags have been heard to say that one doesn't have a
health physics problem until he employs a health physicist. The grain
of truth in the statement is that unless an organization has someone
available to it who understands radiation hazards and who has sufficient nuclear instrumentation at his command to detect and measure
radiation doses, persons may be exposed to ionizing radiation without
one ever knowing it. Because radiation cannot be detected by human
senses, special instruments must be employed to determine how much
of a dose, if any, a person is receiving. In performing his duty of
protecting persons from all unnecessary radiation exposure, and
keeping necessary exposures within permissible limits, the health
physicist relies primarily upon detailed knowledge of the radiation
sources and their intended use. On the basis of such knowledge, he
can work out, or at least approve, procedures which insure maximum safety under the circumstances. Secondarily, he relies upon
46. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 43, at 67.
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personnel and area radiation monitoring instruments which reveal
how much of a dose an individual has received and what sort of
concentrations of radioactive material (or levels of direct radiation) are building up in the air or elsewhere at points of interest.
Various types of film badges and dosimeters are available for this
purpose. Internal concentrations of radioactive materials are determined by use of a "human counter" or by laboratory analysis of urine
and fecal samples. For the purposes of our present discussion it is
sufficient to note that any standard of radiation protection must be
realistic with respect to the state of the art of nuclear instrumentation
at the time. While the new lower levels will require certain new
health physics procedures and possibly new instrumentation, there is
apparently no insurmountable problem in this regard.
E. The Over-All Radiation ProtectionProblem
The new NCRP standards are consistent with the recommendations
made in 1956 by the International Commission on Radiation Protection:
(1) for the population as a whole, the average per capita dose should not
exceed 10 rems, from conception up to age 30 (and by inference one-third
of this amount per decade thereafter); (2) for radiation workers, the individual occupational dose should not exceed 50 rems up to age 30 (and
by inference again this same amount per decade thereafter).47
The following table was prepared by the chairman of the National
Committee on Radiation Protection to indicate the relative importance
of different types of radiation exposure, based on estimates of conditions in the United States today:
RADIATION

DOSE RECEIVED UP TO AGE 3048

Type of Radiation
Natural Radiation (background)
Medical Irradiation
Occupational Exposure
Radiation in Plant Environs
At 1/10 of New MPD
At 1/10 of Old MPD
Fall-out
Total
Maximum Permissible Dose
Balance
47. Taylor, op. cit. supranote 43, at 66.
48. Taylor, op. cit. supra note 43, at 70.

Dose in Man-reins Per
Million of Population
4,000,000
5,000,000
150,000
(150,000)
450,000
200,000
9,800,000
14,000,000
4,200,000
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The maximum permissible dose of fourteen million man-rems is derived by taking the average per capita dose of ten rems, multiplying it
by a million and adding the four million man-rems of background radiation. Medical irradiation is estimated. Occupational exposure is
calculated on the basis of five rems per year for one-fourth of one per
cent of the population over a period of twelve years (age 18-30). Nonoccupational exposure (radiation in plant environs) is estimated on
the basis of irradiating one per cent of the population over a period
of thirty years. At the old permissible levels, this comes to 450,000
man-rems; if the new levels make this permissible dose one-tenth of
the new permissible occupational exposure dose, it will be 150,000
man-reins. Fall-out is placed at double the current rate.
This table helps to put in proper perspective the relative importance
of radiation exposure from regulated sources (occupational and plant
environs exposure) and background, medical, and fall-out radiation
exposure. The purpose of drawing these comparisons it to underscore
the fact that the hazard to our population at large from radiation exposure from peace time applications of atomic energy is not a matter
of alarming proportion today. It would be a mistake to take precipitous action to reduce occupational and plant environs radiation exposure levels by, say, fifty per cent in the hope of reducing over-all
population exposure by half. Peacetime uses of atomic energy only
contribute approximately five per cent to the total radiation exposure
of the population. Elimination of all industrially caused radiation
exposure could not, therefore, reduce the total dose to the population
more than about five per cent. Conversely, however, one should not
be complacent about the hazard. Permissible exposure levels must
be set and enforced in such manner that there is no appreciable
risk of harm to atomic energy workers or members of the public
living in the vicinity of nuclear facilities.
F. Special Cases-MedicalIrradiationand Fall-Out
Two special situations deserve brief mention. The first of these is
the intentional irradiation of persons for medical reasons, diagnostic
or therapeutic. The object of our attention is the patient, not the
doctor or X-ray machine operator who may also be exposed. As to
such non-patients, the permissible levels for occupational exposure
are applicable. Use of X-ray machines and fluoroscopes by doctors and
dentists is widespread. When properly handled, each such intentional
medical exposure should be preceded by a balancing of the benefits
to be gained by such exposure against the risk of harm that may be
caused at the same time. It then rests in the doctor's professional
judgment whether or not to carry out the irradiation. Careful use of
shields for X-ray machines and careful placement of radioactive
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sources in a patient's body can do much to minimize the potential
hazard. The actual dose given to the patient is, of course, not considered to be within the scope of the rules dealing with permissible
radiation exposure levels, nor is the fact that one receives medical
irradiation a basis for reducing the level of occupational exposure
otherwise permissible.
The second special situation is fall-out, which is the deposition of
radioactive debris from nuclear weapons testing. Like background
radiation, fall-out affects the entire population more or less uniformly.
The total population dose from fall-out is slight in comparison to
background radiation and presents no health or safety problems at
the present time. However, it does represent a deliberate exposure
of the public to radiation in excess of background. It is presently accepted as a necessary consequence of military preparedness.

III. A REVIEW OF RADIATION PROTECTION
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Voluntary Self-Control
In 1929 under the sponsorship of the National Bureau of Standards
there was established an Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium
Protection, having a membership representing professional, commercial and governmental groups concerned with safety in the use of
radioactive materials (then, primarily radium) and X-ray machines.
Prior to World War II this Committee issued the following publications:
X-ray Protection, NBS Handbook 15 (1931)
(Superseded by Handbook 20 in 1936)
Radium Protection for Amounts Up to 300 mg, NBS Handbook 18
(1934)
(Superseded by Handbook 23 in 1938)
X-ray Protection, NBS Handbook 20 (1936)
(Superseded by Handbook 41 in 1949)
Radium Protection, NBS Handbook 23
(Superseded by Handbook 54 in 1954)
As can be seen from the titles of the handbooks, during this period
the attention of the Committee was addressed primarily, if not exclusively, to the safety aspects of ionizing radiation from the use of
X-ray machines and radium. The handbooks were written as guides
for persons who might be exposed to radiation from such sources.
They were not regulations in any sense of the word; the Committee, as
a voluntary association, had no regulatory authority over anyone.
After World War II it was apparent that the matter of radiation
protection had acquired a new dimension. In '1946 the Advisory Com-
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mittee was substantially enlarged, the number of participating organizations increased, and its name changed to the National Committee
on Radiation Protection. It now functions through a central committee
and some 18 subcommittees. In the main it continues to provide the
same service as before the war, but on a much broader front. Its
postwar publications include:
Medical X-ray Protection up to Two Million Volts
NBS Handbook 41 (1949)
(Superseded by Handbook 60 in 1955)
Safe Handling of Radioactive Isotopes
NBS Handbook 42 (1949)
Control and Removal of Radioactive Contamination in Laboratories, NBS Handbook 48 (1941)
Recommendations for Waste Disposal of Phosphorous-32 And
Iodine-131 for Medical Users, NBS Handbook 49 (1951)
Radiological Monitoring Methods and Instruments, NBS Handbook 51 (1952)
Maximum Permissible Amounts of Radioisotopes in the Human
Body and Maximum Permissible Concentrations in Air and
Water, NBS Handbook 52 (1953)
Recommendations for the Disposal of Carbon-14 Wastes, NBS
Handbook 53 (1954)
Protection Against Radiations from Radium, Cobalt-60, and
Cesium-137, NBS Handbook 54 (1954)
Protection Against Betatron-Synchrotron Radiations Up to 100
Million Electron Volts, NBS Handbook 55 (1954)
Safe Handling of Cadavers Containing Radioactive Isotopes, NBS
Handbook 56 (1953)
(Superseded by Handbook 65 in 1958)
Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean, NBS Handbook 58 (1954)
Permissible Dose from External Sources of Ionizing Radiation,
NBS Handbook 59 (1954)
X-ray Protection, NBS Handbook 60 (1955)
Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means, NBS
Handbook 61 (1955)
Protection Against Neutron Radiation Up to 30 Million Electron
Volts, NBS Handbook 63 (1957)
Design of Free-Air Ionization Chambers, NBS Handbook 64 (1957)
Safe Handling of Bodies Containing Radioactive Isotopes, NBS
Handbook 65 (1958)
Safe Design and Use of Industrial Beta-ray Sources, NBS Handbook 66 (1958)
While the NCRP did not undertake to recommend (or oppose, for
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that matter) that governmental bodies formalize its radiation safety
standards and procedures into regulations, it nevertheless offered its
assistance to any such body desiring to do so. By such procedure it
endeavored to assure that such regulations would be technically sound
and practically workable. NBS Handbook No. 61, Regulation of Radiation Exposure by Legislative Means, represented a special effort by
the NCRP to provide specific guidelines to state governments in this
respect. Handbook 61 states the NCRP's philosophy on regulated
radiation protection; a discussion of what ought to be regulated and
what not regulated; alternative possible approaches; and finally a
model state Radiation Hygiene Act and model administrative regulations consistent with its other standards as of 1955.
The American Standards Association (ASA) is the second voluntary
organization of major significance that is active in the field of radiation protection. This organization is concerned with establishment of
uniform industrial standards in many fields of endeavor to the end
that progress shall not be impeded by unnecessary diversity. In Decembbr of 1955 at a general conference the ASA initiated a program
to establish a Nuclear Standards Board within the general framework
of the ASA to formulate and adopt standards in the nuclear field in a
manner consistent with procedures customarily used to establish industrial standards in other fields.49
The Nuclear Standards Board has established a number of committees and sub-committees to carry out various assigned tasks as follows:
N-1 Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology
N-2 General and Administrative Standards, with subdivision:
2.1 Color codes and symbols
2.2 Procedures for Industrial Exposure Records
2.3 Qualifications of Nuclear Professionals
2.4 Nuclear Terminology
2.5 Model Atomic Energy Legislation
N-3 Nuclear Instruments
NA Electrical Requirements for Reactors &c.
N-5 Chemical Engineering for the Nuclear Field, with subdivisions:
5.1 Fuel Manufacture &c.
5.2 Radioactive Waste Disposal
5.3 Recovery of Irradiated Fuel
5.4 Use and Handling of Radioisotopes and High Energy
Radiation
5.5 Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials
49. See

ATomcIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR STANDARDS

BY STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUMMARY OF MEETING SPONSORED BY THE COMMITTEE
ON STANDARDS (1957).
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N-6 Reactor Safety Standards, with subdivisions:
6.1 Site Evaluation
6.2 Containment
6.3 Fluid Systems of the Reactor and Fuel Within the Reactor
6.4 Reactor Dynamics and Control Requirements
6.5 Instrumentation and Execution of Control Requirements
6.6 Operation, Operator Qualifications, Inspection and Maintenance and Records
6.7 Failure Probabilities and Maximum Credible Accidents
6.8 Fissionable Material Outside Reactors
N-7 Radiation Protection, with subdivisions:
7.1 Uranium Mines and Mills
7.2 Safety Standards in Uranium and Thorium Refineries
7.3 Isotopic Separations
7.4 Health Physics of Fuel Element Fabrication
7.5 Health Physics for Reactors5
From the foregoing, it will be noted that the Nuclear Standards Board
of the ASA is directing its attention to a number of nuclear standardization matters, of which radiation protection is only a part. Most of
the Board's committees and subcommittees, which are composed of
representatives of interested industrial associations, professional societies and governmental groups, are actively at work. It is too early
today to assess what the impact of their actions will be, but one may
safely prophesy that there will be systematic adoption of standards
acceptable to all of the participating groups and an ever broadening
area of substantial agreement on standards in all of the above areasincluding that of radiation protection. Note that one of the ASA's
avowed purposes is to develop model laws, including radiation protection laws, for matters of concern to the nuclear industry.
B. RadiationProtectionRegulation by the Federal Government
Affirmative action by the federal government to achieve radiation
protection may, in general, be divided into three major categories:
(1) regulations applicable to shipments of radioactive materials by
agencies having jurisdiction over interstate and foreign transportation;
(2) comprehensive control by contract administration over contractors
of the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense governing all aspects of radiological safety connected with government contract programs; and (3) comprehensive regulation over AEC licensees
governing radiation exposure from operation of licensed facilities or
from use of source, special nuclear and by-product materials.
The federal agencies first concerned about control of radiation were
50. ASA Status Report of Projects Under the Jurisdiction of the Nuclear
Standards Board No. CN-34, April 21, 1958.
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those having jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce,
namely, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Post Office and the Coast Guard.5 ' They are concerned about
protecting radiosensitive materials, such as photographic film, which
can be damaged by proximity to radiation, and transportation personnel, who may be injured by radiation exposure from such materials
while in transit. The ICC Regulations provide rather detailed provisions regarding packaging, shielding, and labelling of radioactive materials; limitations on amounts that may be packed in any one container;
types of containers to be used; information to be included on the bills of
lading; procedures for loading, unloading and storing such shipments;
provisions for handling broken or damaged containers, etc. 52 Civil Air
Regulations govern the transportation of radioactive materials by
air. They are in general patterned after the ICC Regulations, but with
somewhat more stringent provisions due to the different operating
circumstances of aircraft.5 3 The Coast Guard Regulations are likewise
patterned in large measure after the ICC Regulations. 54 Postal Regulations specify much more stringent requirements, probably due to
the greater amount of handling of mails by personnel.55 We need not
here elaborate upon the details of these regulations; they apply to
interstate and foreign commerce and hence occupy a realm which is,
in any event, normally and properly within the jurisdiction of the
federal government.
. Many private organizations perform work involving radiation hazards under contract for the AEC. The Commission requires these
contractors to comply with the radiation exposure limits set forth in
Chapter 0524 of the AEC Manual.5 Since December 1957, the AEC
has specified, in general, that the most recently established NCRP
standards, mentioned above, be the applicable radiation exposure
limits to be adhered to by its contractors. 57 The Department of Defense apparently does not have comparable provisions in its Armed
Services Procurement Regulation applicable to all of the Armed Services. The Air Force, nevertheless, as a matter of policy requires its
CPFF contractors who perform any part of the contract upon premises
51. The AEC has recently published a booklet entitled "Handbook of
Federal Regulations Applying to Transportation of Radioactive Materials,"
May, 1958, which conveniently collects the key regulations of the several federal agencies with jurisdiction in the field of transportation.
52. 49 C.F.R. Parts 71-78 (1956).
53. 14 C.F.R. Part 49 (1956).
54. 46 C.F.R. Part 146 (1958).
55. 39 C.F.R. Part 35 (1955).
56. The AEC Manual is a loose leaf service maintained by the Commission
for guidance of AEC and contractor personnel in all phases of Commission
policy and operations. Although not generally available, copies of the Manual
are located at all major AEC installations.
57. AEC Release No. 1231, December 10, 1957.
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under the control of the government to comply with specified requirements to assure the safety of government and contractor personnel. 58
Although we do not know of any study which apportions percentages
of radiation hazards between activities under government contracts
and private activities, we suspect that the great preponderance of
non-medical work involving use of radioactive materials and radiation arises under government contracts; consequently, the great
preponderance of effective governmental control today is probably
exercised by the AEC and the Department of Defense through administration of the contracts pursuant to which such activities are performed.
PERMISSIBLE WEEKLY DOSE
Dose in Critical Organs (mrem)
Conditions of Exposure
Skin, at
Basalof Blood
Lens of
Layer
Epi- Forming Gonads Eye
Radiation
Partsof Body
dermis Organs
*300
*300
*300
*600
Any radiation
Whole body
with half-value-layer
greater than 1
mm of soft tissue.
Whole body

Any radiation
with half-value-layer less
than 1 mm of
soft tissue.
Any radiation

1,500

300

300

Hands and fore300
**1,500
arms or feet
and ankles or
head and neck
* For exposures of the whole body to X- or gamma rays up to 3 mev,
this condition may be assumed to be met if the "air dose" does not
exceed 300 mr, provided the dose to the gonads does not exceed 300 mrem.
"Air dose" means that the dose is measured by an appropriate instrument
in air in the region of highest dosage rate to be occupied by an individual,
without the presence of the human body or other absorbing and scattering
material.
** Exposure of these limited portions of the body under these conditions
does not alter the total weekly dose of 300 mrem permitted to the bloodforming organs in the main portion of the body, to the gonads, or to the
lens of the eye.
58. Air Force Procurement Instruction Sec. 7-4047. The other Department
of Defense agencies probably have comparable requirements.
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The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permits private organizations to
obtain source, special nuclear, and by-product material from the AEC
pursuant to appropriate licenses, and by license to own and operate
facilities for the production or utilization of special nuclear material.59
Part 20 of the AEC Regulations 60 sets forth the AEC's official "Standards for Protection Against Radiation." This regulation, which applies
to all persons (other than AEC contractors) under the jurisdiction of
the AEC, in general codifies the recommendations of the NCRP as
set forth in NBS Handbooks 52 and 59. In section 20.101 (a) and Appendix A it establishes maximum permissible radiation exposure for
adults in restricted areas, as indicated in the table on page 419.
For minors in restricted areas and for all persons in unrestricted
areas, the limits are, in general, one-tenth of the foregoing, according
to sections 20.101 (c) and 20.102. Permissible concentrations of radioactive material in the air in restricted areas and in air and water in
unrestricted areas are set forth in detail in special tables at sections
20.101 (b) and 20.103 and appendix B, covering some eighty-four radioisotopes and also unidentified or mixed radiation emitters. In addition,
the regulation contains provisions concerning area surveys in section
20.201, use of personnel monitoring equipment in section 20.202 and
posting of areas where there is a radiation hazard and marking of
containers of radioactive materials in section 20.203. Sections 20.401
through 20.403 also require record keeping and reporting of accidents
or loss of radioactive materials.
In addition to the foregoing, it may be worthwhile to mention in
passing that the United States Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education & Welfare probably has an emergent, although not yet clearly defined, role to play in the field of radiation
protection. It has long worked closely with the AEC on health physics
matters, chiefly through the Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering
Center in Cincinnati, Ohio. Recently it established within its Bureau
of State Services a Division of Radiological Health. It is likely that in
the future this Division will function in an advisory capacity for
both state and federal radiation protection programs.
C. RadiationProtectionRegulation by the States
There was some, but little, state action to regulate radiation protection prior to 1954. Passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 relaxed
tight federal ownership and control over many aspects of atomic energy and was intended to stimulate private atomic development.
Attention then focused upon the possible need for control of the
59. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 53, 62, 81, 103 and 104, 68 Stat. 919, 42

U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2092, 2111, 2133 and 2134 (Supp. IV, 1957).
60. 57 Fed. Reg. 511 (1957).
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attendant radiation hazards. Many state governments were thus
stimulated into action, either adopting comprehensive regulations,
sometimes pursuant to special legislation, in a manner comparable to
and generally consistent with the AEC regulation for licensees, or
promulgating specific regulations or statutes designed to control only
certain radiation hazards.
As of the present writing, California, 61 Connecticut,6 2 Massachusetts,63 Michigan, 64 New York,65 Pennsylvania 66 and Texas 67 have
chosen to follow the comprehensive control scheme. Other states
either have less than comprehensive control or none at all. Arizona
and Maryland, for example, appear to have no radiation protection
regulations. A number of states require radiation users to register
with a state department, usually the department of public health. 68
Other states have partial regulations which are concerned with certain
specific situations. Utah, for instance, has regulations governing airborne radioactivity in uranium mines.69 Wisconsin limits certain types
of radiation exposure in places of employment and public buildings. 7 0
A summary of the status of radiation protection regulation in all
of the states as of late 1957 appears in the Stanford Law Review article
by Professor Frampton' The Atomic Industrial Forum has recently
published another such summary, which was current as of mid-1958. 7
Due to the rapidity with which developments are occurring in this
field today, any such survey is likely to be out of date by the time it
is published.
61. Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, art. 53, 2 CCH

751-17,766 (1957).

ATOMIC ENERGY

62. Conn. Sanitary Code, ch. III, § 181-1-287, 2 CCH AToMIc

7f17,791-17,809 (1957).

L.

REP.

ENERGY

L.

ff 17,
REP.

63. Mass. Dep't of Labor and Industries, Div. of Industrial Safety Industrial
Bulletin 5, 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. f 17,851-17,851q (1957).
64. Mich. 1954 Admin. Code, Supp. 13, §§ R325.1301-R325.1322, 2 CCH

ATOMIC ENERGY L. RE'. 1 17,871-17,891 (1957).

65. N.Y. Industrial Code Rule 38, 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. jflf 17,90117,973 (1955); N. Y. City Sanitary Code, art. 6, 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP.
11117,974-17-974j (1958); N.Y. Public Health Reg. 16 (1956).
66. Penn. Dep't of Health Reg. 433, 2 CCH ATOMIC ENERGY L. REP. 1111
18,00118,022 (1956).

67. Texas Dep't of Health Reg. on Radiation Exposure, 2 CCH ATOMIC
1111
18,351-18,373 (1956).
68. See S.D. Dep't of Health Reg. on Radiation Control, ch 2, 2 CCH ATOMIC
ENERGY L. REP. 111118,271-18,273 (1957).
According to ATOMIc INDUSTRIAL
FORUM, INc., STATE AcT v rrEs IN ATOMIC ENERGY (1958), the following addiENERGY L. REP.

tional states have comparable regulations:

linois, Kansas, North Dakota and Wyoming.

Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Il-

69. Utah Industrial Comm'n, General Safety Order, Reg. 2 (1955).
70. Wis. Industrial Code § 20.02 (4).
71. Frampton, Radiation Exposure-The Need for a National Policy, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 7 (1957).
72. ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INc., STATE ACTIVITIEs IN ATOMIC ENERGY
(1958).
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D. The Status of State-Federal Radiation Protection Regulations Today
Generally, regulation to provide public and industrial health and
safety is a subject within the police powers of the states. The federal
government's jurisdiction in this area may arise under its power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, its war powers, its power
to control disposition of government property, or its power to attach
conditions to the use of federal funds. It is interesting to note that
one of the first questions which attracted legal attention in connection
with state-federal regulation of radiation exposure was whether the
federal government had power to control radiation exposure in private, peacetime atomic energy activities. 3 The Atomic Energy Act of
1954 was carefully drafted so as to utilize all of the broad national
powers mentioned above.7 4 It is doubtful that any serious question can
be raised as to the constitutionality of federal regulation in this regard.
Based upon such constitutional powers, the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 quite explicitly confers upon the Atomic Energy Commission the
responsibility and authority for protecting public health and safety
in connection with the program it administers and also the activities
75
of private concerns which it licenses.
An open question exists, however, as to whether or not the federal
government has pre-empted the field of radiation protection regulation.7 6 The Atomic Energy Act itself is silent on this point. In addition, the AEC has never claimed that the federal act pre-empted the
field but has, in fact, offered assistance to the states in preparing state
radiation protection codes. Nevertheless, to the extent that state radiation protection regulations are inconsistent with, or perhaps even
consistent with but overlapping, federal regulations, they are under a
legal cloud. This situation has prompted several proposed amendments
to the 1954 Act to clarify state-federal responsibilities for radiation
protection: the "Durham Bill,"7 7 the "Anderson Bill,' 78 the "Neuberger Bill," 79 and an AEC draft bill, which was informally submitted
73. Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime
Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 Mic. L. Rav. 333 (1954).
74. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 2 and 3, 68 Stat. 918, 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2012, 2013 (Supp. 111, 1956).
75. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 2b, 2d, 2e, 2f, 3d, 31a, 31d, 53a, 53b, 63b,
69, 81, 103d, 104a, 104b, 104c, 104d, 161b, 161i, and 182a, 68 Stat. 918 (1954), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2013, 2051, 2073, 2093, 2099, 2111, 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232 (Supp.
1I, 1956).

76. See irebs and Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development,

21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 182, 190-91 (1956); Frampton, Radiation ExposureThe Need for a National Policy, 10 STAN. L. REv. 7, 22-29 (1957).
77. H.R. REP. 8676, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).

78. S.REP. 4298, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). A.S. REP. 53, 85th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1957).

79. Cavers, Legislative Readjustments in Federal and State Regulatory
Powers over Atomic Energy, 46 CALI.n L. Rav. 22 (1958); S.REP. 1228, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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to the Joint Committee in June of 1957. These proposed measures
have been discussed at length elsewhere 80 and we shall not elaborate
upon them here, except to note that probably none of them will be
adopted in its original form.
The Joint Committee is planning hearings on this particular subject in 1959, as a result of which there may be an amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which more clearly delineates the respective roles of federal and state governments in this field. A major purpose of this article, particularly the information presented in the
following section, is to present major considerations which should,
in our opinion, be reflected in the allocation of legal responsibility for
radiation protection between the states and the national government.
IV. A PROPOSED DIVIsioN

OF RESPONSIBILITY

BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AI

THE STATES

A. Review of EssentialFactorsInvolved
Any program to regulate radiation protection will necessarily involve specification of categories of radiation covered and categories of
persons regulated. It will probably also deal specifically with types
of radiation sources, types of activity involving radiation and radioactive materials and classification of hazards. It may make special
provision for various types of facilities. The ability of any new system
for radiation protection to cope satisfactorily with all these various
factors will be one yardstick by which alternative proposals can be
judged. We have therefore set down a number of these essential factors in tabular form for easy reference:
1. Types of Radiation
a. Alpha radiation
b. Beta radiation
c. Gamma and X-Radiation
d. Neutrons
e. Heavy Particle radiation
2. Categories of Persons Responsible for Safety in Nuclear Operations
a. Federal agencies and employees
b. Contractors of the federal government and their employees
c. State government agencies and employees
d. Contractors of state governments and their employees
e. Private persons and organizations with AEC licenses
f. Private persons and organizations without AEC licenses
g. Physicians, dentists, etc.
3. Types of RadiationSources
a. Naturally radioactive materials
Uranium
-In nature
80. Frampton, Radiation Exposure-The Need for a National Policy, 10

STAN. L. REV. 7, 49-51 (1957).
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-After removal from state of nature
-After concentration and refining
-Fuel for nuclear fission
-After separation of U-235 from natural uranium
Thorium
-In nature
-After removal from state of nature
-After concentration and refining
-As high temperature metal alloy
-As fertile material in breeder reactors
Radium isotopes and their decay products
-In nature (uranium ore)
-After removal from state of nature
-After concentration and refining
-In needles and capsules, etc., for medical use
-In paints and coatings to provide luminescence
b. Materialsmade radioactive artificially
Fissionable radioactive materials
-Plutonium
-Uranium-233
Non-fissionable materials
-Radioactive fission fragments
-Materials activated by neutron exposure or other processes
c. Processes creating radiation
Nuclear fission
-- Subject to continuous control-as in reactors
-Not subject to continuous control-as in weapons
Nuclear fusion
-- Subject to continuous control-as in reactors
-Not subject to continuous control-as in weapons
Particle acceleration
Electron bombardment-as in X-ray machines and fluoroscopic
devices
Nuclear reactions-as in polonium-beryllium neutron sources
4. Types of Activity Involving Deliberate Creation of Radiation or Use
of Radioactive Materials
a. Military applications
Nuclear weapons
-Research and development
-Manufacture
-Testing
-Stockpiling
Fissionable material production and separation
Nuclear propulsion for ships
-Powerplant research, development and testing
-Nuclear ship operations
Nuclear propulsion for aircraft, rockets, missiles, etc.
-Powerplant research, development and testing
-Vehicle operations
Nuclear propulsion for land vehicles
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-Powerplant research, development and testing
-Vehicle operations
Nuclear power generation equipment
-Research, development and testing
-Operations
Food preservation by radiation sterilization
-Research and testing
-Production operations
b. Civilian applications (non-medical)
Use of nuclear reactors for
-Power generation
-Research and testing
-Production of radioisotopes
-Process heat
-Propulsion
-Other
Use of radioisotopes for
-Industrial applications
-Agricultural applications
-Other
Use of industrial X-rays
Use of radioactive metals as alloys
Use of electronic equipment emitting radiation
Use of particle accelerators in research
Educational activities involving training in handling of radioactive
materials, reactors, etc.
Transportation of radioactive materials
c. Medical applications
Diagnostic and therapeutic use of X-ray and fluoroscope machines
Use of external radiation from natural and artificial sources, for
research, diagnostic and therapeutic purposes
Use of radiation doses taken internally for research, diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes
d. Nuclear fuel cycle
Uranium and thorium mining and milling
Feed materials processing
Gaseous diffusion separation
Chemical processing
Metallurgical processing
Fuel element fabrication
Chemical reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel
Radioactive waste disposal

5. Types of Radiation Exposure Hazard (Including Normal Operation and
Accidents)
a. Class I.A.-Possible harm limited to persons and property in immediate vicinity of nuclear operations-radiationlevels relatively low
Use of X-ray machines and fluoroscopes
Use of low-level radioisotopes where there is no possibility of internal exposure
Use of source material as metal alloy
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Creation of radiation by certain radar, T.V. and other advanced
electronic equipment
Mining and milling of uranium and thorium
b. Class I.B.-Possible harm limited to immediate vicinity of nuclear
operations-butradiationlevels relatively high
Use of high level radioisotopes
Use of radioisotopes where internal exposure is possible
Use of high voltage particle accelerators
Fuel element fabrication
c. Class .A.-Possible harm not limited to immediate vicinity of nuclear operations-radiationlevels relatively low
Low level radioactive waste disposal
Use of low power research reactors
d. Class II.B.-Possible harm not limited to immediate vicinity of
nuclear operations-radiationlevels relatively high
Chemical separation of U-235
Production reactor operations
Nuclear weapons testing
Power reactor operations
Test reactor operations
High power research reactor operations
Military propulsion reactor operations
Chemical reprocessing activities
High level radioactive waste disposal
6. Types of Facilities
a. Nuclear fuel cycle facilities
Mines and mills
Feed materials plants
Separation plants
Chemical processing plants
Metallurgical processing plants
Fuel element fabrication plants
Chemical reprocessing plants
Waste storage and disposal facilities
b. Nuclear weapons facilities
Fissionable material production facilities
Weapons fabrication plants
Weapons storage bases
Weapons test sites
c. Military propulsionfacilities and vehicles
Reactor manufacturing plants
Reactor testing stations
Nuclear powered ships and their operational bases
Nuclear powered air and space vehicles and their operational bases
Nuclear powered land vehicles and their operational areas
d. Military nuclearpower stationsfor field use
Reactor manufacturing plants
Reactor testing facilities
Operational reactors
e. Food irradiationfacilities
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f. Centralnuclear power stations

g. Nuclear researchand experimental testing facilities
Particle accelerators
Gamma source facilities
Research reactors
Test reactors
Nuclear materials laboratories
(Note: Research and development laboratories may be associated
with almost any of the other facilities listed. They may be separate
facilities by themselves. They may also be part of an educational or
medical institution plant.)
h. Process heat reactors

i. Isotope productionreactors
j. Facilitieswhere radioactiveisotopes are used

(Note: Radioisotopes may be used almost anywhere without special
facilities.)
k. Medical centers using X-ray machines and radioisotopes
1. Transportation equipment employed for shipment of radioactive
material
B. Possible Theories About Division of Responsibility Between National and State Governments
Is it desirable to divide the responsibility for radiation protection
between the federal government and the states? Let us first examine
the position of the federal government. National responsibility for
many radiation hazard producing activities is too well established and
accepted to permit complete withdrawal from the field in favor of the
states. Nuclear operations associated with nuclear weapons research,
development, manufacture, testing and stockpiling is an integral part
of our national defense program. The same is true of nuclear operations related to use of atomic power for ship propulsion, air and space
craft propulsion, land vehicle propulsion, and power generation for
military field operations. It is therefore necessary and proper for the
federal government to retain full responsibility for controlling the
radiation hazards associated with such activities-and to do so on an
exclusive basis.
If one grant that the federal government is properly in the business
of regulating radiation protection, is it necessary or appropriate for
the states also to regulate in this field? Professor Frampton has ably
argued that dual control by federal and state governments is unworkable as a practical matter, that an over-all national program is essential, and that the most logical course is pre-emption of the field by the
federal government. 81 The states, through grants-in-aid, or similar
devices, would participate only in the enforcement and inspection of
the national program on terms laid down by Washington. If he is
right in concluding that a single, over-all national radiation protection
81. Id. at 7.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

program is essential, we agree that the national government, probably
acting through the AEC (but possibly through the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare), is the proper agency to discharge this
responsibility.
Prior to World War II, however, the states had full responsibility for
radiation protection regulation-with the exception of interstate transportation of radioactive materials. Today the states still have exclusive
responsibility for regulation of radiation from non-fission sources,
namely, X-ray machines, fluoroscopes, particle accelerators; from
naturally radioactive substances not regulated by the Atomic Energy
Act, primarily radium; from source material prior to its delivery to the
Atomic Energy Commission; and from a not yet clearly defined assortment of electronic equipment, such as certain advanced television and
radar sets, which are beginning to emerge as radiation emitters. None
of these radiation sources presents a widespread public health risk;
rather, any risk from their use is limited to persons in their immediate
vicinity. These sources are industrial health hazards, circumscribed in
area of potential harm.
Unless there really is a paramount need for a single, uniform, overall radiation protection program covering all persons and all types and
sources of radiation in all of the various types of applications, facilities and circumstances where radiation is purposefully involved, we
believe it is best for the states to retain jurisdiction over those aspects
-of radiation protection which have no significant interstate or national aspects.
The reasons advanced in favor of an over-all centrally directed
national program boil down principally to two:
(1) The basis for all regulation is the standard maximum permissible dose to the individual and the standard maximum
permissible concentration of radioactive material that may
be released without further control back to the environment; these standards are based on scientific considerations;
where there is a variance between jurisdictions-as there is
likely to be if the states are permitted to set their own
standards-the validity of all standards will be cast into
doubt. Equipment manufacturers will be obliged to meet
conflicting requirements. And the process of adjusting to
standards which are revised from time to time by the scientific
community will be multiplied by the number of jurisdictions
involved.
(2) Ours is a peripatetic society. Radiation exposure has a cumulative effect. The only way to keep track of the total exposure
received by any given individual who moves from state to

RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATION

1959 ]

state is to have a uniform standard throughout the country
(if not, indeed, the whole world) and uniform cumulative
exposure records. Without such procedure nobody's cumulative dose can be known with certainty or controlled effectively.
The fallacy of the first reason mentioned above is that it ascribes
greater quantitative significance to the concepts of "maximum permissible dose" and "maximum permissible concentrations for uncontrolled release to the environment" than is warranted. It implies a
black-and-white distinction that does not in fact exist. Perhaps this
point can best be illustrated graphically:

ExternalExposure
REM

Lowest level possibly fatal
(approx. 200 rem)
F1001

These are all
acute doses,
that is, received in 1 day
or less.
____Lowest level where transient

effects are clinically detectable (approx. 65 rem)

---

NCRP "Once-in-a-lifetime
emergency dose" (25 rem)
AEC Reg. Part 20-PermisSsible

dose for monitored per-

sonnel (15 rem)
New NCRP Permissible Dose
for montitored personnel (5
frem)
Typical doses of employees at
research facilities (0-2 rem)
AEC Reg. Part 20-Permissible dose for unmonitored personnel (1.5 rem)

These are all
average annual doses,
that is, received over a
365 day period.
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Remember, first, that the radiation exposure we are here discussing
is occupational and plant-environs exposure which constitutes only
about five per cent of the total radiation exposure to which the population is being subjected.
Disregarding genetic effects for the moment, one can see from the
above chart that the maximum dose of 15 rem per year allowed by
the present AEC regulations is well below the dose that one must receive in order to have clinically detectable transient effects even when
received in an acute dose, that is, all within twenty-four hours. The
new NCRP recommendations are even lower. With respect to injury
to the individual exposed, the margin of safety is already so great
that minor variations in specific maximum permissible dose standards
pale into insignificance. It is comparable to a difference in speed limit
between five or ten miles per hour when the speed that is dangerous
is sixty miles per hour. As a matter of fact, for over a year the AEC
itself has been administering two different standards: five rem average annual dose for AEC contractors, fifteen rem for licensees. This
discrepancy, which looks large because it is a factor of three, has not
caused any dislocation of the atomic energy program to our knowledge.
If, then, one state were to take the five rem standard and another a
ten rem standard, the inconsistency would not cause a greater hardship.
A second reason why meticulous uniformity of permissible dose is
not important is that the techniques and instruments used for personnel monitoring are not presently so refined that one can determine
exactly how great a dose any given individual has in fact received.
Any dosimeter worn or carried by a person will, of course, register
only the radiation that strikes it. Unless the circumstances of exposure
are known and under special control at the time, it is assumed that
the individual received the same dose to his entire body. Obviously
this is only an approximation. If he wears the dosimeter in a shirt
pocket it may record the radiation that approaches him at his face
fairly accurately. If the radiation is from behind, the shielding effect
of his body will reduce the recorded dose. Both direct-reading dosimeters (electroscopes) and film badges have this limitation. When one
also takes into account the limits of calibration accuracy, the limits
of accuracy in reading the)film or instrument, and the difference between absorbed tissue dose and "instrument dose," the best over-all
accuracy one can obtain is on the order of 50-90 per cent (depending
on the dose levels involved) for film badges and about 80 per cent for
direct-reading dosimeters. Because radiation exposure cannot be
controlled down to the last millirem, and because the dose one receives cannot be determined by personnel monitoring methods until
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after the exposure has occurred, carefully planned health physics
programs keep all exposures to a minimum. This is ordinarily well
below NCRP maximum permissible doses. In fact, it was this practice
of keeping occupational exposures well below permissible levels that
made it possible for the NCRP to revise its standards downward without causing serious difficulties.
Even less do considerations of genetic injury require exact uniformity between states. We have previously mentioned how obscure
are the causal links between radiation exposure and genetic injury.
While lowering of the NCRP maximum permissible dose from fifteen
to five rem per year on the average was based upon recommendations
of geneticists, it reflected the basic concept that the best dose is no
dose. Since the state-of-the-art of radiation protection had progressed
to the stage where a reduction of the maximum permissible levels by
two-thirds had become feasible, such reduction became ipso facto desirable, particularly when dealing with unknown consequences, such
as genetic injury. Nevertheless, occupational and plant-environs
exposure still constitute only a small fraction of the total population
exposure to radiation. The recent reduction recommended by the
NCRP will have only a slight effect in reducing total population dosage. And minor variations from state to state will have a negligible
effect.
Accordingly, we do not believe non-uniformity in maximum permissible dose between states is calamitous, once one appreciates the
nature of the standards involved. Variation in standard will not cast
doubt as to whether one is right and another is wrong. Both lie in an
area of discretionary judgment. Nor does the plight of the equipment
manufacturers appear too difficult. In the first place, the only equipment involved is that having to do with personnel exposure. Such
equipment is a small fraction of all nuclear equipment sales. In the
next place, there does not appear to be any reason why the manufacturer cannot, if he is mass producing such a product, set his specifications to meet the strictest standard. He will find that most of his
customers prefer to comply with the strictest standard even if not
required to do so. And he will find his competitors are facing the
same problems he has. We recognize that the problem of the equipment supplier exists; however, it does not appear to us to be significant.
We likewise recognize that the process of adjusting to revised standards will be made more difficult in proportion to the number of jurisdictions involved. That a greater time lag will be involved is inevitable. However, if one will agree that exact uniformity is not essential,
then the non-uniformity caused by changing standards is no cause
for alarm.
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We do not mean to imply that uniformity is not desirable. It ordinarily is, and probably is here too. Lack of uniformity, however, is
acceptable under the special circumstances that obtain in the field of
radiation protection regulation. Furthermore, it seems likely that
substantial uniformity will be achieved informally. The states that
have adopted regulations thus far have all worked closely with both
the NCRP and the AEC. The industrial concerns that form a portion
of the persons to be regulated have the opportunity to express themselves in favor of uniformity either directly to the state officials or
indirectly through participation with the American Standards Association.
The second major reason advanced in favor of an over-all national
program is that only such a program can cope with the mobility of
the population in this country today. The thought is that cumulative
lifetime exposure records are needed. Such records are impossible
unless radiation protection regulation standards are uniform and
the records kept are uniform.
In examining this reasoning closely, let us first bear in mind that
the only persons we are talking about are workers at establishments
using radiation sources and keeping individual personnel exposure
records. We are not considering members of the public generally, nor
even those who linger at the plant fence and receive exposure. No
records are kept for such persons. Their protection lies in the rule
that they are not permitted to receive more than one-tenth of the
maximum permissible dose for monitored personnel. Such persons
could remain at the fence indefinitely without receiving a dose of
sufficient magnitude to cause them "appreciable bodily injury."
Our concern here is for the worker who is monitored. It seems selfevident that what is important here is not uniformity of radiation protection standards, and not even uniformity of record keeping, but
rather availability of records. If you are an employer in State X hiring
a nuclear employee from State Y, the only regulation that concerns
you is that in State X. You comply with that regulation. When you
hire the employee, you want to know what his radiation exposure history is, so that you will know whether he can be assigned to an area
where he may be exposed. Whether or not his cumulative exposure to
date excaeds the limits of State Y is irrelevant. Whether the limits in
State Y are the same as in State X is likewise irrelevant. And in view
of what we have previously said about the effects of non-uniformity of
standards, probably any lack of uniformity is also immaterial.
Uniform records would be of help in this situation. However, the
second employer can always take data furnished by the first employer and put it into such form as he desires. The biggest problem
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that occurs in this situation appears to be that of obtaining any data
at all from the first employer. Health physicists quizzed on this point
have consistently reported that some organizations are very willing to
cooperate in this regard and some are not. Failure to cooperate is
often due to the idea that the records are confidential as far as the
employee is concerned and should not be divulged without his express
permission. When this is the case, usually the prospective new
employee will provide the required consent. In some cases failure to
cooperate is attributed to "company policy" and records are not made
available even when the employee does consent. This causes the
second employer to speculate whether the employee might in fact
have received an overdose which his prior employer preferred not to
reveal. Congress could solve this problem by requiring an employer
to furnish such records upon request of a prospective or actual new
employer. The power to regulate interstate commerce would certainly
seem adequate to justify such a statute. In any event, the real problem is not uniformity of regulatory standard, nor uniformity of
record keeping, but availability of records.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, we are not persuaded that the
circumstances. of radiation protection regulation necessitate preemption of the field.
Our next question is whether the field is intrinsically divisible, and,
if so, how it should be divided. Section A above listed major features
involved in radiation protection regulation. Any one of them could
serve as a basis for division of responsibility, e.g.:
1. Types of Radiation
States-Alphas and betas
U. S. -Gammas, neutrons, heavy particles
2. Categories of Persons
States--State agencies, employees, and contractors; private
persons and organizations with and without AEC
licenses; physicians, etc.
U. S. -U. S. agencies, employees and contractors
3. Types of Sources
States-Thorium, radium, activated materials, particle acceleration, electron bombardment, nuclear reactions
U. S. -Uranium, plutonium, fission fragments, fission, fusion
4. Types of Activity
States-Civilian applications, medical applications
U. S. -Military applications, nuclear fuel cycle
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5. Types of Hazard
States-Classes I.A., I.B., II.A.
U.S. -Class II.B.
6. Types of Facility
States-Central power stations, process heat reactors, isotope
production reactors, some R & D facilities, isotopes,
medical facilities
U. S. -Fuel cycle facilities, weapons facilities, military propulsion facilities and vehicles, military power stations, food irradiation facilities, some R & D facilities,
transportation equipment
It is apparent that some of the above categories would be better
than others as the basis for dividing the field and that probably no
one alone is adequate. Other possible ways of dividing the responsibility can undoubtedly be suggested. The way that appears to us to
be most promising is described in the following section.
C. Recommended Division of Responsibility Between the States And
The FederalGovernment
In our estimation the most straightforward way to ascertain whether
and where a line can be drawn between federal and state jurisdiction
for radiation protection is first to determine the bounds within which
there is a paramount national interest, sufficiently great to justify
exclusive jurisdiction by the federal government. As we see it, the
area of any such paramount national interest will be defined by:
(a) The needs of national defense,
(b) Matters of interstate significance, and
(c) Matters in which the federal government has a direct financial interest.
Radiation protection regulation which is not directly related to at
least one of the above criteria should be left to state jurisdiction.
To control radiation hazards, one must control the materials and
machines which produce ionizing radiation. The category, "Types of
Radiation Sources," noted above in section IV.A. will therefore best
serve as the basis for our present discussion. Our attention will be
directed at first to the possession and use of such materials, excluding
their transportation. The subject of their transportation will be given
separate treatment subsequently.
Uranium: Natural uranium (which contains both U-235 and U-238)
is important strategically as our primary source of fissionable material.
Uranium ore is mined and milled primarily by private concerns.
Then the AEC buys it and sends it to feed materials processing plants.
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After this process it can be used as fuel for natural uranium reactors
or it can be sent to a gaseous diffusion plant where the proportion of
U-235 to U-238 is increased to whatever extent is desired for the
particular purpose to which it is to be put. After being used in a reactor for a period of time uranium fuel becomes "poisoned" by buildup of fission fragments which will ultimately prevent the fission
process from occurring. The "spent" fuel is then sent to a chemical
reprocessing plant where the fission fragments are separated out and
the usable uranium recovered. Among the usable fission fragments are
U-233 and plutonium, both of which are, in turn, fissionable. Nuclear
weapons use plutonium, primarily. Reactors can use U-235, U-233 or
plutonium.
Natural uranium is classified legally as "source material."82 Plutonium, uranium-233, and uranium enriched with U-233 or U-235 are
83
classified as "special nuclear material."
The AEC's radiation protection program presently includes all persons possessing or responsible for use of source material, subsequent
to AEC purchase of the milled ore,8 and all persons possessing or
responsible for the use of special nuclear materials. 85 Persons who
possess the uranium or plutonium do so either as government contractors or as AEC licensees, subject to Part 20 of its Regulations.
Radiation protection in connection with the possession and use
of uranium or other special nuclear materials in support of our
weapons program is rightly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
AEC. Such activities are intimately connected with our defense program. The same is true of possession and use of uranium and other
special nuclear materials in support of the AEC's reactor development
program.
Use of uranium and plutonium for private reactors, whether the
reactors are for research, testing, power production or isotope production, is indirectly, if not directly linked to our national defense. Their
use requires appropriation out of the national stockpile of fissionable
materials. And operation of these reactors is regulated by AEC license,
to be sure-among other matters-that the user will not divert any
fissionable material he possesses or creates to an improper use.
Furthermore, the United States had a direct financial interest in the
safe operation of many, if not all, of these reactors. Under the Price82. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11.x, as amended, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42
U.S.C. § 2014 (Supp. V, 1958).
83. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § l1.y, op. cit. supra.
84. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 63, 68 Stat. 933 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2093
(Supp. V, 1958).
85. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 53.e, as amended, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42

U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. V, 1958).
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Anderson Amendment to the 1954 Act86 the AEC now furnishes indemnification up to five hundred million dollars for public liability arising
out of nuclear incidents caused by privately owned and operated
AEC licensed facilities. Thus any nuclear incident at such facilities is
likely to result in direct costs to the federal government. Finally,
with the large reactors particularly, there may be possibility of multistate harm, resulting from widespread fission fragment deposition in
the event of a reactor excursion. Each of these reasons supports exclusive federal responsibility for radiation protection control over the
use of uranium and other special nuclear materials in private reactors.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 presently requires the AEC to investigate the safety of all such reactors and to license their operation
only if no undue risk to the public is involved.87 The AEC has a
Reactor Hazards Evaluation Staff and Reactor Safeguards Committee
which pass on the safety of each reactor in the country. Safety
analyses for a nuclear facility, particularly one of a new design, are
highly technical and complicated. The AEC already has some of the
best available minds in the country at its disposal for this service.
Consequently, there is also a practical reason why to leave the AEC
with exclusive jurisdiction over safety of design and operation of all
reactors.
A somewhat similar position is occupied by private organizations
which prepare nuclear fuel for private reactor operations. These concerns perform chemical and/or metallurgical processing upon natural
uranium or enriched uranium. They also fabricate fuel elements. No
possible interstate hazard is involved, however, and it is optional with
the AEC whether to grant Price-Anderson indemnification for such
concerns when operating under AEC license. Nevertheless, because of
the practical considerations noted above, and the indirect, if not direct,
connection with defense, it would appear best to assign exclusive responsibility for radiation protection regulation of such operations to
the AEC.
Uranium and plutonium are used in two other contexts that deserve
special mention. The first is in research laboratories. Relatively
small amounts of U-238, U-235, U-233 and plutonium are frequently
needed for experimental research. Virtually no defense aspects, no
interstate features, and no direct federal financial interest are involved. It would therefore seem best to leave responsibility for radiation safety for such use to state governments.
The second context is commercial use of these materials other than
86. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2012 (Supp. V, 1958).

87. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 103d, as amended, 70 Stat. 1071 (1956), 42

U.S.C. § 2183 (Supp. V, 1958) and § 104d, 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134

(Supp. V, 1958).
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for reactors. Plutonium in a sealed container has been used as a light
source in some electronic equipment. Uranium could, presumably, be
used in a similar application. Perhaps these materials will be found
valuable in a metal alloy for some special use. The federal interest
here seems quite remote. It would therefore appear best to leave
radiation protection regulation of such situations to the states.
We previously mentioned that at present the AEC radiation control
program attaches to the use of uranium after purchase of the ore by
the AEC. Radiation safety in uranium mines and milling operations
is presently left to the states. We see no reason why this arrangement
should not continue.
Thorium: Thorium is naturally radioactive. Its strategic importance
lies in the fact that it is a "fertile material" which can be used in a
reactor to produce U-233.
Thorium is classified as a "source material."' ' Essentially the same
considerations apply to it as apply to natural uranium. The federal
government should maintain radiation safety responsibility for thorium in connection with its processing (after purchase by the AEC)
and its use in reactors. The states should be responsible for safety
regulations of possession and use of thorium prior to delivery to AEC;
in laboratories; and when used other than in reactors, as in magnesiumthorium, a high temperature metal alloy.
Radium: Radium isotopes have a series of radioactive decay products,
none of which are fissionable material. Neither the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 nor the act of 1954 assigned the AEC any responsibility
for providing safety from radiation from radium. There does not
appear to be any reason of national defense, interstate implications or
national financial interest which would justify transferring jurisdiction for radiation safety for radium from the states to the federal
government.
Artificially made radioactivematerials: Some artificially made radioactive materials are fissionable, namely, U-233 and plutonium. These
are classified as special nuclear material. 89 Responsibility for radiation
protection in their use should be handled in the manner as "Uranium,"
described above.
In addition to the foregoing, there is an almost endless variety of
other materials that can be made radioactive, though not fissionable, by
artificial means. Almost any material will become radioactive to some
extent upon exposure to neutron radiation. Activation is most easily
accomplished using a reactor, but can be accomplished using a particle
accelerator. Another type of artificially radioactive material is the
radioactive fission fragments that build up in the nuclear fuel in a
88. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11.x, op. cit. supranote 82.
89. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § lM.y, op. cit. supranote 83.
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reactor core during nuclear operations. Upon reprocessing of the fuel,
these radioactive materials are separated from the re-usable uranium
and plutonium. They may then be considered waste products and disposed of, or they may be packaged and used. Such materials, if produced by neutron activation, will be first in the possession of the
person with whose machine they were activated. If obtained from
fuel reprocessing, they will be in AEC possession at the outset.
With the exception of waste disposal, it is highly doubtful that use
of these radioactive isotopes falls within the area of national interest
as defined by national defense, interstate implications, or national
financial interest. In the past AEC responsibility for radiation safety
in their use resulted from the AEC's role as radioisotope distributor.
Congress gave the AEC authority to make by-product material available to licensees only if the recipient would observe AEC safety
standards. 90 "By-product material" is defined in the 1954 act as "any
radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or
made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process
of producing or utilizing special nuclear material." 91 It includes nonfissionable, artificially radioactive materials produced and distributed
by the AEC and by AEC licensees. It does not extend to identical
radioisotopes produced with privately operated non-licensed accelerator equipment. Thus present AEC responsibility in this area is not
based upon a careful balancing of whether the states or the federal
government should have the governmental responsibility for regulating radiation protection in the use of this type of radiation source.
Rather, it is based upon the idea that the AEC should look out for any
risk to the public health and safety resulting from the use of any
such sources distributed by the AEC.
There is one good reason why the states should be assigned this
responsibility. Uses of radioactive isotopes in industry are already
widespread and are increasing each year. If the AEC is to retain jurisdiction for all health and safety associated with radioactive by-product
material, it will soon have an obligation to keep track of operations in
every agricultural, industrial and medical establishment of consequence in the United States. It would therefore appear much more
practical to have this responsibility exercised by the state and local
governments.
Disposal of radioactive waste (which is normally by-product
material but can include source and special nuclear material)
is a more complicated matter. It is usually accomplished by one
90. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 81, 68 Stat. 935 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2111

(Supp. V, 1958).

91. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § ll.e, 68 Stat. 922 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2014

(Supp. V, 1958).
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of three techniques. The waste may be diluted to safe levels and dispersed back into the environment by dumping it into sewers or into
the air by exhaust stacks. Or the waste may be concentrated and
confined in "burial vaults," not to be released to the environment
until its radiation levels have lowered to safe levels by passage of
time and natural decay of radioactivity. Or it may be dumped in the
ocean, using containers to prevent dispersal for some interval of time
and then relying upon the ocean to provide dilution.
Such radioactive waste disposal appears to involve three distinct
orders of magnitude. The greatest quantity of most highly radioactive
waste is collected at the AEC's reprocessing plants. The next greatest
quantity of fairly highly radioactive waste is accumulated in connection with operation of reactors and other nuclear facilities. Here
there are not only the fission fragments (which are normally unseparated from the nuclear fuel) but also, in the case of research, teAt and
isotope production reactors, materials intentionally irradiated and
made radioactive. The third level of magnitude is the waste disposal
of by-product material which has been supplied to industrial, agricultural, medical and other concerns and which has become useless for
one reason or another.
To us it appears advisable to assign the responsibility for radiation
protection regulation of the first two categories to the AEC and to
leave the third to the states. Waste disposal has an inherently interstate quality. Radioactive materials disposed in sewers ultimately find
their way to interstate waterways and the ocean. Radioactive material
diffused into the atmosphere will not remain over the state where it
was released. Radioactive materials buried in the ground may get
into underground water supplies. There is a danger that waste of
permissibly low concentrations from one source will combine with
like waste from another source and produce contamination levels that
are too high. This situation supports the argument that al1 radioactive
waste disposal should be under federal control. However, it is believed
that the third category of by-product material uses mentioned above
generates such a small quantity of radioactive waste and that the level
of its radioactivity is so low that there is no appreciable interstate
hazard involved. If the volume and/or radioactive levels of such
waste ever become high enough to have a significant interstate impact,
the federal government should be given exclusive control over all
radioactive waste disposal.
NucZear Fission: In the process of nuclear fission there is a considerable release of direct radiation in addition to the radiation normally
emitted by the radioactive material present. Under present law facilities in which controlled fission can occur fall under the rubric either
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of "production facility" or "utilization facility. 9 2 They must either
be owned by the federal government and operated for it or licensed
by the AEC. 93 Responsibility for radiation protection control over all
operations of reactors and other production and utilization facilities
should probably remain with the federal government. The reasons for
this conclusion are given under the heading of "Uranium" above.
Nuclear Fusion: The only practical use developed to date for nuclear
fusion has been nuclear weapons. Much study is being expended upon
ways to achieve fusion under conditions of continuous control. Some
of this study is privately financed. Most of it is AEC financed. When
machines or processes are developed which permit continuous fusion
to be sustained, operation of the machine or process will be subject to
the same AEC licensing, safety analysis, and Price-Anderson indemnity as fission reactors. Accordingly, we believe radiation protection
responsibility for fusion operations should be assigned to the federal
government.
Particle Acceleration: Certain machines are designed to accelerate
charged particles of the atomic nucleus. These accelerators are used
primarily for research, but are also used for medical therapy. The
hazard they present is limited to persons in the immediate vicinity.
No national defense, interstate aspects or federal investment is involved. In the past the responsibility for regulating their safety has
been left with the states. No reason is now apparent for changing this
arrangement.
X-Ray Machines and Fluoroscopes and Other Electronic Equipment: X-ray and fluoroscope machines are in very widespread use by
doctors, dentists and hospitals for medical diagnosis, therapy and research. They are also used in certain industrial applications. Radiation
created by their use is hazardous only to persons in the immediate
vicinity. The same is true of some advanced types of electronic equipment which emits some radiation incidental to normal operation. Like
particle accelerators these radiation sources have previously been
subject to control only by the states. Like accelerators their use does
not involve any paramount national interest. Any regulation to assure
safety in their operation should therefore remain with the states.
Nuclear Reactions: The final type of radiation producing process to
be mentioned is the nuclear reaction. A good example of this is the
juxtaposition of polonium and beryllium in such a way that the alpha
92. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11.t, as amended 71 Stat. 576 (1957), 42

U.S.C. § 2014 (Supp. V, 1958).

93. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 91, 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2121
(Supp. V, 1958) and § 101, as amended, 70 Stat. 1071 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 2131
(Supp. V, 1958).
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radiation from polonium (a radium decay product in some forms)
reacts with beryllium to release neutrons. One use of this reaction
is to provide neutrons as reactor starter sources. Other reactions may
be similarly used. Probably such reactions are also used in nuclear
research and possibly for industrial applications, such as chemical
catalysis. No paramount federal interest is involved. Consequently,
we believe the states should be responsible for any safety regulation
applicable to use of such reactions, except where such use is part of
reactor operations.
Radioactive Material Transportation:Transportation of radioactive
materials was expressly excluded from the foregoing discussion. The
federal government will necessarily maintain jurisdiction over interstate carriers. The only real question is whether the states should be
given the responsibility for radiation protection in intrastate ship.
ments. The criteria of paramount national interest which we have
been using throughout do not seem very relevant in this situation.
Clarity for its own sake is probably the best guide here. Locating the
point at which intrastate commerce begins and interstate commerce
ceases is probably a hopeless task. If we were to use this distinction as
a basis for establishing jurisdictional bounds between states and the
federal government, there would always be a grey area in which
neither government could be sure of its own authority or of the
authority of the other. Accordingly, it would appear to be best to
assign to the federal government jurisdiction for radiation control
over all transportation of radioactive materials. Has Congress the
power to give federal agencies jurisdiction over radiation protection
regulation for instrastate transportation? In our opinion it has. Certainly if it has the power to pre-empt the whole field, it has power
to pre-empt one small corner of it.
D. A Challenge for CooperativeFederalism
In the foregoing discussion we have recommended our plan to
divide responsibility for radiation control between the states and the
federal government, by reference to all major sources of ionizing radiation. Attention must now be directed to some associated questions
which were not considered above:
(1) Would the respective jurisdictions of state and federal governments be mutually exclusive? Or would they be concurrent,
and if so in what areas?
(2) Would U. S. government facilities or contractors be subject to
state regulation?
(3) Would a single private facility be subject to regulation by both
state and federal governments at the same time?
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These questions pose a challenge for cooperative federalism. Is it
possible for the states and the federal government each to recognize
that the over-all matter of radiation protection regulation involves a
host of controls over a variety of types of radiation source, categories
of atomic energy activities and legal classifications of persons and
facilities to be regulated-part of which is so closely related to paramount national interests that federal control is essential and part of
which is so unrelated to national interests that federal control is not
warranted? Can this rather complicated field be clearly divided, so
that part is the responsibility of the states and part the responsibility of
the federal government, without ambiguity, without gaps, without
overlapping, unless done for a purpose? Does the federal government
have enough confidence in the states to permit them to establish their
own programs governing situations where the national interest is slim
or non-existent-even though they may differ from the federal standard and from one another? Can the federal government tolerate state
regulation and inspection of the federal facilities and contractors
with respect to that area of radiation protection responsibility assigned
to the states? Or will the federal government permit the states to
function in the field only on condition their regulations in no way
affect the federal government? Will there be "give-and-take," or
will it be all "take"? This is the challenge of cooperative federalism.
And this is the question Congress will have to decide when it amends
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to clarify who is responsible for what
in radiation protection regulation in the United States today.
There are several policy guidelines which we believe come into play
in this situation. Some of these were noted in the preceding sections.
Others were implicit. Altogether they are as follows:
(1) Unless the subject of radiation protection is so indivisible or
so interrelated that the only sensible program is a single,
over-all national program, the federal government should be
responsible for regulation only in areas where there is a
paramount national interest. The states should be responsible
for the remainder.
(2) Paramount national interest should be defined in terms of
national defense, interstate implications and direct national
financial investment.
(3) The line of demarcation between federal and state jurisdiction should be as clear and simple as possible.
(4) There should be no gaps between the respective jurisdictions
of the states and the federal government. Overlapping jurisdiction should be avoided. If not, areas of overlap should be
clearly identified.
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(5) Insofar as possible, each person regulated should be answer(6)

able to only one government agency.
Consistency and uniformity of radiation protection standards
and personnel monitoring records is desirable.

We believe the best approach is to have mutually exclusive areas of
jurisdiction assigned to the federal government and the states. A
fairly clean-cut division of the field can be accomplished in the manner
described above. Separate and exclusive jurisdiction by each government will avoid unnecessary duplication. By focussing responsibility
clearly, it will minimize the chances that a particular hazard is not
properly controlled because each regulatory agency thought the
other was looking into it. It can provide a basis for mutual respect,
trust and interchange between federal and state officials involved. It
will avoid the present unsatisfactory situation in which states are passing comprehensive regulations, overlapping the federal regulations,
casting doubt in the minds of persons being regulated whether they
are subject to dual regulations on the same point and imposing enforcement obligations on state agencies sometimes in excess of their
budgetary or other capabilities.
If two, mutually exclusive jurisdictional areas are established,
should AEC facilities and AEC contractors be subject to or exempt
from state regulation as to matters generally within state jurisdiction?
In the converse case, i.e., AEC regulation of state agencies and contractors, it is clear that no exemption from federal regulation is in order. The area of federal jurisdiction is established by reference to
certain paramount national interests. Such interests will exist no less
where the party regulated is a state government or one of its agencies
or contractors.
The reverse is not true, however. The area for state jurisdiction is
established as that in which there is no significant federal interestwhen considering private parties as the subject of regulation. If the
federal government is the party to be regulated, at least two federal
interests are involved: (1) the cost of compliance with the regulations, and (2) the submission to authority not created by Congress.
When a federal contractor is involved, the federal interests involved
are extra contract cost due to contractor compliance with state regulations, and some loss of control over the contractor's activities.
This situation is closely related to the case of the private party who
is subject to federal regulation with respect to part of his operations
(research reactor operation, for instance) and state regulation with
respect to another part (by-product material in the laboratory, for
instance). It is definitely advisable from the point of view of the party
regulated to have only one agency with which it has to file reports
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and by which it will be inspected. A good procedure might be to have
one agency, state or federal, be the "primary regulatory agency" with
respect to the party or installation involved. The federal agency would
have to be given the power of choice whether it or the state agency
should be the primary regulatory agency in any given case, since the
federal agency would be custodian of the national interest. Once such
a selection is made, the primary regulatory agency could then be the
repository for all reports that are required and make all inspections
to insure compliance with the regulations. The primary regulatory
agency could inform the secondary agency in whatever detail the
secondary agency requires. In this manner both state and federal
regulations can be effectively administered.
Federal facilities and contractors could be handled in the same fashion. If the contractor's only use of radioactive materials is within the
area for state jurisdiction, the AEC (assuming it is the federal agency)
could elect whether to allow a state agency to enforce its regulations
against the contractor or whether to undertake the enforcement aspects itself and notify the state officials. The same procedure could
be followed for federal facilities. By giving the AEC power of decision
whether to be the primary regulatory agency, all national interests can
be assured. By having the state regulations apply to all persons, without exception for federal contractors and facilities, the simplicity of
jurisdictional division is retained. We believe this procedure would
offer one practical solution to the problem of how to have separate
state and federal jurisdiction over radiation protection and yet have a
simple, clean-cut system that does as little violence to federal-state
relationships as possible.
V.

SUMMARY

Radiation protection regulation is a subject in which both the states
and the federal government have a legitimate interest. The subject is
not monolithic; federal pre-emption of the entire field is not necessary
or particularly desirable. Aspects of radiation protection regulation
of particular importance to the federal government can be clearly
identified and responsibility therefor assigned to one or more federal
agencies. Other aspects, not of significance to the federal government,
should be classified as a state responsibility. The following table summarizes a recommended division of authority between state and
federal governments:
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U. S. Government

States

All source material being used or
processed in the nuclear fuel cycle
after purchase by the AEC

All source material and its use prior
to its purchase by the AEC, i.e., mining and milling

All special nuclear material being
used or processed in the nuclear fuel
cycle or in nuclear weapons

Laboratory use of source and special
nuclear material
Commercial use of source and special
nuclear materials other than for reactors
All radium isotopes and their decay
products

By-product materials in the possession of operators of production and
utilization facilities, and reprocessing
plants and disposal by such operators
of radioactive waste resulting from
such operations

By-product material use and radioactive waste disposal by persons other
than operators of production and
utilization facilities and reprocessing
plants

Production and utilization facility design and operations-both fission and
fusion
Particle accelerators
X-Ray Machines, Fluoroscopes and
Advanced Electronic Equipment
Nuclear Reactions
Transportation of radioactive materials
The division of jurisdiction should be exclusive. However, as to
persons whose activities are under the jurisdiction of both state and
federal regulations, the federal agency should elect whether to be the
primary regulatory agency or whether to ask the state agency to perform such function. Thereafter the primary regulatory agency should
be the sole point of radiation regulation enforcement and inspection,
with all reports filed with such agency and all inspections made by its
personnel. The primary regulatory agency should provide the secondary agency with any information the latter desires concerning radiation protection regulation compliance by the regulated party.

